Do Bankers Ration More Credit?

Sylvie Cieply Université de Caen Normandie ; CREM (Centre de recherche en économie et management). Contact : sylvie.cieply@unicaen.fr


Has credit rationing increased in France over the last ten years? This article looks for an answer by comparing the results of the same survey carried out in 2000 and 2012 on two different but comparable samples of bankers specialized in firms’ financing. Our results confirm that strong credit rationing (total refusal) is limited to potential customers although weak credit rationing (restrictive quantity) is used to regulate the credit market when relationships between banks and firms has been established. Our results indicate too that both total refusals and quantitative restrictions are less often used by bankers in 2012 than in 2000 and that bankers more frequently introduce collaterals and covenants in debt contracts. Despite the amendment of usury ceilings for firms, the role of interest rates remains low. We observe that this decrease in credit rationing comes with the rationalization of the system for taking decisions on the basis of financial criteria.


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Footnotes

1   La littérature sur ce sujet est très abondante. Sur le plan théorique, on peut noter l’article fondateur de Bernanke et Gertler (1990) et, parmi les articles plus récents, ceux de Clementi et Hopenhayn (2006) et d’Antràs et Caballero (2009).

2   Parmi les articles empiriques, on peut noter l’article fondateur de Fazzari et al. (1988) et la revue de la littérature de Schiantarelli (1995).

3   La distinction entre rationnement partiel et rationnement complet se retrouve dans beaucoup de travaux, en particulier ceux d’Eurostat réalisés sur la question de l’accès au financement des entreprises européennes et l’article récent de Kremp et Sevestre (2013). La distinction entre rationnement fort et rationnement faible a été introduite par Freimer et Gordon dès 1965.


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